I’m setting up FDE and wonders which one is better. “LVM over LUKS” or “LUKS over LVM”? Or something else? Does one is definitely better then the other? What are your preference?
Thanks.
I’m setting up FDE and wonders which one is better. “LVM over LUKS” or “LUKS over LVM”? Or something else? Does one is definitely better then the other? What are your preference?
Thanks.
If an attacker has physical access to your device, you should not use the device afterwards, ever. There are some mitigations like Secure Boot and Heads OS, but they only slow down the attacker. Given enough time, you cannot stop him. Heads OS is pretty much for giving your laptop to airport security temporary and Secure Boot has been hacked in a minute. Although that was using TMP outside of the CPU, I would not trust Secure Boot with TMP 2.0 for anything other than a quick customs check either.
Using FDE as a protection against physical attacks is just a false sense of security. Veracrypt for example go as far as to say that secure boot is false sense of security.
For maximum paranoia there is a use for FDE, though. If you install a crappy app that saves data outside of RAM, /home, /var and /tmp, the data won’t get leaked. Though that would be a massive security issue because most linux computers are servers which cannot use FDE.
For secure bypasses I could only find BlackLotus is the only one capable to do this. I would like to have more details to support the claim “Secure Boot has been hacked in a minute.” Also, I would like the explanation on secure boot is a false sense of security and points to suport such claim as BlackLotus is the only publicly known malware to bypass secure boot.
However, I do firmly believe that there ia no reason that servers can’t use FDE as they are no differ than other typical computer.
I think people tend to get hung up on where you store the key material for a server. Hardware token and TPM being two options that are less secure, but network bound disk encryption is supported as well as a combination. So you could have it require the network key as well as the matching PCRs from the TPM for the proper software load before it will unseal.
Hardware token being less secure?
If I steal the server I have the token, unless someone is physically going to unlock the server every time you reboot which is not realistic.
The most common physical attacks will be you misplacing your device or some friend/burglar/cop taking it. FDE works great in those scenarios.