While Ukraine’s acceptance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appears unattainable, armed neutrality may be the country’s next best option to protect against future Russian aggression.
Invading Ukraine has created economic and military challenges for Russia. If only Putin supported the invasion, and everyone else in Russia opposed it, Putin wouldn’t be the President of Russia now. So, we must try to understand who in Russia supports this action. The military / security services are an obvious answer - they would see the risk of a NATO expansion up to the Russian border as a danger that must be avoided at all costs.
“Putin had no problems in 2004” is incorrect. Russia’s reaction to the expansion of NATO in 2004 was immediate, harsh, and contained threats of specific counter-measures.
“In 2007, he suddenly got scared” is an incorrect interpretation. The Munich Speech of 2007 was not a sudden reaction of fear, but a thoughtful, ideological and strategic statement by a strengthened Russia. It marked the transition to a tougher and more independent foreign policy course based on rejection of American hegemony and an insistence on taking into account Russian security interests.
The rhetorical escalation was not the result of a sudden emotion, but the result of the accumulation of systemic contradictions, the unwillingness of the West to take into account Moscow’s concerns and the strengthening of Russia, which was ready to challenge the status quo that did not suit it.
Invading Ukraine has created economic and military challenges for Russia. If only Putin supported the invasion, and everyone else in Russia opposed it, Putin wouldn’t be the President of Russia now. So, we must try to understand who in Russia supports this action. The military / security services are an obvious answer - they would see the risk of a NATO expansion up to the Russian border as a danger that must be avoided at all costs.
deleted by creator
There are many issues with your comment.
“Putin had no problems in 2004” is incorrect. Russia’s reaction to the expansion of NATO in 2004 was immediate, harsh, and contained threats of specific counter-measures.
“In 2007, he suddenly got scared” is an incorrect interpretation. The Munich Speech of 2007 was not a sudden reaction of fear, but a thoughtful, ideological and strategic statement by a strengthened Russia. It marked the transition to a tougher and more independent foreign policy course based on rejection of American hegemony and an insistence on taking into account Russian security interests.
The rhetorical escalation was not the result of a sudden emotion, but the result of the accumulation of systemic contradictions, the unwillingness of the West to take into account Moscow’s concerns and the strengthening of Russia, which was ready to challenge the status quo that did not suit it.
In the 90s and early 00s, Russia had bigger issues to worry about.